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Chapter 9: Pharmaceutical policy and politics 
 
Richard Freeman
i
 
 
 
Introduction 
Perhaps the key difference in the practice of medicine at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century compared to a hundred or even fifty years previously is the 
prescription and use of therapeutic drugs.  With this change, health politics has changed, 
too. 
 For health care is a problem of political economy.  When health care states were 
established, this problem took the form of the distribution of its costs between capital and 
labour, employers and employees.  And in most countries and systems, the burden of 
insurance premia has been divided between the two.  As far as pharmaceuticals are 
concerned, however, what is consumed in one part of the economy is produced in 
another.  There is a trade-off to be made between benefits to doctors and patients in the 
health care state, and those which accrue to firms and shareholders in the health care 
industry. 
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 For the health care state, as Michael Moran has famously explained, is not only a 
welfare state but also an industrial capitalist state, as well as a liberal democratic state 
(Moran 1995, 1999).  As such, it is faced with dilemma and compromise at every turn.  In 
respect of pharmaceuticals, this takes the following form.  To guarantee access to health 
care means ensuring the availability of medicines, and doing so means addressing 
familiar distributional issues of who gets what, when, how.  Governments and providers 
want to improve the quality of treatments they offer to citizens: they are concerned to 
promote therapeutic innovation, but also to protect patients from possible associated 
risks.  Meanwhile, major pharmaceutical firms are emblematic of national economic 
success: they provide employment of high quality and often high volume, their 
production generates considerable added value, and they are a principal source of foreign 
export earnings.  In this context, the government interest is both to sponsor and to 
discipline industry, to maximise its possible earnings and its possible contribution to 
health but to minimise its potential cost.  This dilemma – a 'quadrilemma', in Weisbrod's 
(1991) phrase - is the more difficult in democratic states, where the decision making 
process is subject to powerful lobbying on the part of producer interests and subject to 
electoral approval (or otherwise) on the part of consumers.  Furthermore, as Burton 
Weisbrod suggests, it has an accelerating, dynamic quality: the market for new drugs is 
predicated in large part on public coverage of much of their costs, which in turn feeds 
new and increased demand (Weisbrod 1991). 
 Yet things are more complicated still.  More than other elements of health care 
systems, pharmaceutical research, production and marketing are unusually 
internationalised.  This has been a feature of the industry since it first developed in its 
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modern form in the later decades of the nineteenth century, and contrasts markedly with 
the predominantly national organisation and regulation of the medical profession, for 
example.  National economies and health systems are exposed to the global market in 
pharmaceuticals to different degrees and in different ways, though all are subject to 
changes in an environment essentially beyond their control.  While attempts at the 
international regulation of that market began in the 1990s, it remains dominated by global 
networks of global producers. 
Across OECD countries, total expenditure on pharmaceuticals amounts, on 
average, to slightly more than 1.3% of GDP (table 1, below), and to around 17.5% of all 
health spending (OECD 2006).
ii,iii
  In most countries, more than half of pharmaceutical 
expenditure is reimbursed by public funds, such that public spending on pharmaceuticals 
represents something like 13.8% of GDP (table 2).  At the same time, the average share 
of GDP devoted to pharmaceuticals has increased in most OECD countries by around 
50% since 1970, in line with increases in health spending.  Even in countries with 
relatively moderate health expenditure growth, such as the UK or the Netherlands, the 
growth of the share of pharmaceuticals in GDP has been significant. 
 
[table 1 here] 
 
[table 2 here] 
 
Public expenditure on pharmaceuticals (table 2) tends to be highest in countries 
which combine extensive coverage with high levels of consumption, such as Japan, 
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Germany and France.  In the US, where public coverage is limited, public expenditure on 
drugs is low although total pharmaceutical spending is at the OECD mean.  
Pharmaceutical expenditure levels per head of population tend to be lower in northern 
European countries, where doctors are paid mainly by salary and capitation.  They are 
highest in Japan, the United States, France, Belgium and Germany. 
 The distribution of pharmaceutical production is disproportionately concentrated 
in five to ten countries.  The United States remains the major producer: although its 
market share declined between 1970 and 1980, when other countries showed relatively 
stronger growth, it has remained stable since then.  The US position has been sustained 
partly by the very strict requirements for market entry in the pharmaceutical sector, and 
partly by high levels of domestic consumption.  Of course, pharmaceuticals are 
manufactured goods, often originating from countries like the US, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Germany and the UK which have high living standards and high labour costs.  This 
means that pharmaceutical expenditure tends to be a relatively heavier burden for health 
care systems in poorer countries.  Hence, pharmaceutical spending as a proportion of 
GDP is highest in countries such as Portugal, Greece, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
and much lower in countries such as Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Switzerland and 
the Netherlands. 
 A ranking of standard trade balances underlines the strong position of countries 
with a research-based pharmaceutical industry, such as Switzerland, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, though it is notable that, in relative terms, the United States is not a big 
exporter of pharmaceutical goods.  Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland also have a 
significant surplus, while the French surplus is relatively small in comparison to its 
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overall domestic production.  At the other extreme, Japan is the biggest importer of 
drugs, which reflects the limitations of its own industry (Balance et al 1992, Thomas 
1995).  Adjusting trade performance to the size of the domestic market underlines the 
success of the Scandinavian exporting countries, Denmark and Sweden, as well as of the 
United Kingdom and Germany.  By contrast, some European countries such as Greece, 
Finland, Portugal and Norway have large deficits.  Australia, Canada and Austria also 
import a significant share of their therapeutic drugs. 
 Not surprisingly, those countries which enjoy a strong international position are 
also the home countries of large multinational exporting companies.  This is particularly 
true for Switzerland (Roche, Novartis), the United Kingdom (GlaxoSmithKline), Sweden 
(AstraZeneca) and Germany (Bayer).  The United States (Merck, Pfizer, Johnson & 
Johnson, Bristol Myers Squibb, Lilly) ranks highly in international terms simply due to 
the size of the US market (which is around a third of the total OECD markets, and which 
also means that US-based firms control roughly half of pharmaceutical production in the 
OECD area). 
 In sum, pharmaceutical spending represents a small but significant share of the 
GDP of most OECD countries.  Pharmaceuticals absorb a significant share of health 
expenditure and, critically, an increasing share of public spending on health.  There is 
evidence that pharmaceutical spending, like health spending in general, is closely 
associated with national wealth, but also that it is subject to specific institutional effects.  
The next section of this chapter discusses the range of regulatory instruments used by the 
governments of OECD countries to steer the production, trade and use of medicines. 
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Policy instruments 
 
Given the range of objectives governments have in formulating pharmaceutical 
policy, it is inherently unlikely that they will find a single measure or 'magic bullet' to 
meet their needs or cure all ills.  Instead, they deploy a range of instruments, targeted at 
various aspects of demand and supply, in something like a policy variant of combination 
therapy. 
 
Defining the market 
One of the first functions of pharmaceutical policy is to define the scope and 
extent of the market itself.  This involves setting rules for market entry, such as 
establishing the efficacy and safety criteria which must be met before a given drug may 
be sold or distributed.  Such tests are administered by the FDA in the United States, and 
its equivalents in other countries. 
 Where medicines are covered by public schemes, as for example by social 
insurance in Germany and the Netherlands and by the NHS in the UK, a second task is to 
define the basket of goods which will be eligible or listed for reimbursement.  Adjusting 
and updating this list is the most immediate way governments influence demand: in most 
OECD countries lists are revised several times a year, either by the relevant Ministry 
(usually Health) or by a specific body in charge of pharmaceuticals such as PHARMAC 
in New Zealand.  Sometimes lists are subject to more extensive revaluation as in France, 
where the government also conducted an extensive revaluation in 1999, and in Germany, 
where the government excluded over-the-counter drugs from reimbursement in 2004. 
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 However, not all countries provide universal coverage for pharmaceuticals.  
Where this is the case, as in the United States and Canada, each insurer has to draw up its 
own list or formulary, as do HMOs in the US, for example.  In Canada, while Medicare 
does not cover pharmaceuticals, the federal government provides drug coverage to 
specific groups (Vandergrift and Kanavos 1997).  For their part, provincial and territorial 
governments subsidise the cost of prescription drugs for at least some sectors of the 
population, notably seniors, social assistance recipients, individuals with specific disease 
conditions, and in some cases, home and community care recipients.   
 
Patient copayments 
The very function of insurance is to separate immediate financial considerations 
from others concerning access to services.  But where demand is not regulated by price, 
as is the case with pharmaceuticals covered by a public scheme, there is a risk of over-
consumption (which is much greater for pharmaceuticals, for example, than other 
elements of health care such as hospital stays).  In practice, therefore, almost all 
insurance schemes, both public and private, set some level or type of copayment (or 
deductible) a patient must make for pharmaceuticals.  Even the tax-funded NHS in the 
United Kingdom introduced copayments soon after it was established, extending them 
significantly in the early 1980s. 
Copayments certainly have an effect on drug consumption, and seem to be more 
efficient when related to the price of the drug rather than set at a fixed rate per 
prescription; maximum efficacy in terms of reducing consumption seems to be reached at 
rates of about 25% (Newhouse 1993), though this figure may be country- and context-
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specific.  Cross-national evidence suggests that limiting the level and scope of patient 
reimbursement inhibits the use of essential as well as non-essential drugs.  This means 
that while such measures may reduce public spending, they may also reduce the cost-
effectiveness of drug use (Freemantle and Bloor 1996). 
 Because the distributional effects of direct payments by patients are regressive, 
lower income groups and those with chronic and serious illness tend to be 
disproportionally affected by them.  Many OECD countries counter this problem with 
extensive exemption schemes and safety nets: in the UK, for example, almost 50% of the 
population is virtually exempt from copayments on prescription drugs (though the 
eligible list of such drugs is more restricted than in Germany or France).  On the other 
hand, some countries have copayment policies which may appear more illusory than real.  
In France, for example, most of the population has supplementary insurance which 
reimburses most or all of the copayments set by the principal public schemes.  Germany 
and the Netherlands, meanwhile, like Japan and some other countries, have banned this 
kind of cost-shifting by reinsurance, precisely because it erodes the incentives put in 
place elsewhere in the system. 
 
Physician prescribing 
 Often, governments first move in seeking to contain public spending on 
pharmaceuticals is to increase the financial responsibility of patients by introducing or 
extending copayments.  Targeting providers comes second.  Most western European 
countries as well as managed care schemes in the United States have implemented some 
sort of monitoring of physician prescription, supplemented by various tools intended to 
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influence prescribing in particular ways, including auditing, the use of guidelines and 
fixing drug budgets. 
 The United Kingdom has long made considerable efforts to influence doctors' 
prescribing behaviour (Rochaix 1993, GAO 1994b).  Information benchmarking their 
patterns of prescription against those of their colleagues has been made available to 
doctors for a long time in the form of the Prescribing Analysis and Cost (PACT) data 
collected by the Prescription Pricing Authority.  France, too, has long had a periodic 
review of physicians' individual prescribing activity, the Tableaux Synthétiques d'Activité 
des Praticiens or TSAP.  In the NHS in the UK, targets and budgets have been used to 
constrain GP prescribing.  Savings seem to have been achieved through doctors' greater 
willingness to prescribe generic rather than branded drugs, and to a greater receptiveness 
to the use of computerised prescription management systems.  Although direct evidence 
of the impact of these initiatives is scarce, UK prescription patterns in general appear to 
be rather more cost-efficient than those of other countries, with lower rates of 
unnecessary prescribing and of the use of relatively expensive drugs. 
 Prescription guidelines have been in place in most OECD countries since the mid-
1990s (Mitchell 1996).  They can be either positive, indicating generally appropriate 
prescribing policies or negative, as in France, where they state what should not be done 
and set possible sanctions.  Meanwhile, global pharmaceutical budgets have been set for 
the physicians' association of each regional state in Germany, under the terms of health 
reform legislation passed in 1993.  Budgets were introduced in a similar fashion in 
France under the Juppé Plan of 1996 (in both cases, financial penalties for over-supply 
may apply to pharmaceutical companies, too).  Finally, where prescribing and dispensing 
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functions are held jointly, as they have been in Japan and to a limited extent in the 
Netherlands, there are clear incentives for doctors who also dispense medicines to over-
prescribe.  In both countries, in consequence, governments have been concerned to 
separate these essentially different tasks (Seo 1994 , Japanese Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 1996). 
 One problem underlying all attempts to modify doctors' prescribing behaviour is 
that evidence of what determines it in the first place remains scant.  Budgetary and other 
incentives appear to have more effect than the simple provision of information, though 
few of these various methods have been subject to rigorous testing (Bloor and Freemantle 
1996).  Information and guidelines collected, collated and issued by providers and public 
authorities compete with information disseminated by manufacturers through advertising, 
sponsoring conferences and other benefits, and personal visits to physicians by sales 
representatives.  In this respect, pharmaceutical supply is a battle between government 
and industry to influence doctors.  Meanwhile, prescription appears to be strongly based 
in habit: studies in France, for example, have shown that doctors tend to remain 
insensitive to economic considerations as long as they do not themselves bear the cost of 
the decisions they make (Lancry and Paris 1995).  This reveals the extent to which 
improving the appropriate and cost-effective use of medicines turns on the regulation not 
only of markets but also of the professions, and is likely to be possible only through 
extensive collaboration with them. 
 
Price fixing and reference pricing 
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 In so far as price fixing creates distortions in markets, it is not applied to many 
goods.  For several decades, however, pharmaceuticals have been subject to extensive 
and wide ranging price fixing in OECD countries.
iv
  Today, pharmaceutical prices are 
free in only a minority of OECD countries, though this minority includes some major 
players such as the United States and Germany.  In general, public authorities become 
interested in price fixing when prescription pharmaceuticals are deemed intrinsic to 
universal health care entitlements and when patient access to drugs is to be protected 
against financial constraints, but public funds are limited.  In Canada for example, a 
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board has set maximum prices for patented drugs since 
1987. 
 Because the UK's Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) determines an 
initial or 'benchmark' price for a drug, manufacturers are concerned that it be set as high 
as possible, in the knowledge that this launch price will subsequently be contained, if not 
fixed.  This makes the UK a lead market, of some significance in determining how others 
work. 
 The difficulty with price fixing in the case of pharmaceuticals is that prices are 
fixed for what is apparently traded on the market, namely boxes, while in fact what is 
actually bought is a certain set of chemical substances with therapeutic properties.  In the 
case of pricing by the box, the price-fixing mechanism is highly vulnerable to 
manipulation (Abbott 1995, Schönhöfer 1999): minor changes in strength, packaging, or 
some recomposition of the chemical formula will help to make the product appear new.  
This means that it can be artificially priced higher for the same therapeutic properties. 
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 The effectiveness and appropriateness of price fixing depends, of course, on the 
level at which the price is fixed.  OECD countries use a combination of criteria to fix the 
prices for drugs supplied to patients under public schemes. These include the therapeutic 
value of the drug, reference to existing products and/or to international comparisons, and 
the contribution of pharmaceuticals to the national economy.  In Canada, the guidelines 
of the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board include several tests: for a similar 
chemical product, tests are performed which measure it against others with a comparable 
molecular structure; for breakthrough products which promise substantial therapeutic 
improvements, international price comparisons are made using exchange rates averaged 
over the previous 36 months; for similar or moderate therapeutic improvement products, 
a therapeutic class assessment is made with comparable medicines of comparable dosage. 
 Reference pricing sets a standard rate of reimbursement for specific drugs.  
Strictly defined, a reference price is established by comparing a branded product with its 
generic equivalents.  In a more general sense, however, it may involve similar products of 
the same therapeutic class though not necessarily the same chemical formula.  Reference 
pricing has largely been developed in countries with a large public reimbursement system 
and a strong, research-oriented pharmaceutical industry, mainly in Northern Europe.
v
  
Most extensive use of it has been made in Germany, as well as in Denmark, Sweden and 
the Netherlands, though it also formed a substantial part of changes made in Italy in 
1996.  As of 1 January 1999, reference prices for drugs in Germany may not exceed the 
price at the first tercile of the distribution of products within a given reference group (for 
drugs without reference prices, public health insurance reimburses the price of the drug 
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less a fixed amount).  The introduction of this system led initially to very significant 
savings of several billion Euro a year although, over time, its effect has diminished. 
 In the German scheme, the difference between the branded price and the reference 
price of drugs with the same active ingredients or a similar pharmacology has to be borne 
by the patient.  This should, in theory, give the patient a strong incentive to be 
discriminating in her use of medicines.  However, when her ability to switch to generic 
products is limited by a lack of appropriate information, for example, this mechanism 
puts some patients at risk of incurring increasingly high direct, out-of-pocket costs.  In 
this situation, it is the pharmacist who often guides a patient's decision.  For this reason, 
reference pricing is often linked with a pharmacists' right, coupled with incentives or 
even an obligation, to substitute one product for another. 
 
Profit controls 
 Governments use profit controls to a lesser extent than price controls, though 
Spain has taken costs into account in determining prices since 1991.  Meanwhile, in spite 
of its name, the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme in the United Kingdom has 
specified a permitted rate of return on capital when companies submit new products for 
approval. Drug companies are free to set their own prices but may not exceed a 
predetermined profit ceiling.  By the same token, prices for existing products cannot be 
raised.  The scheme has been in operation in various forms since 1957 and covers all 
licensed, branded prescription medicines sold to the NHS (80% of all NHS 
pharmaceutical spending). Over time, the government has both lowered the rate of return 
and adopted a more restrictive approach as to which types of drugs should be approved. 
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 The UK scheme (UK Department of Health 1997) has attracted much attention, 
not least because it seems to have combined a strong performance by UK-based firms in 
pharmaceutical markets with a relatively low level of domestic health spending on the 
NHS (GAO 1994a, GAO 1994b, Thomas 1995).  In practice, however, the scheme is less 
than transparent (Bloom and van Reenen 1998), and seems to have been successful 
largely due to the ability of public authorities to establish and maintain a flexible and 
reliable relationship with pharmaceutical manufacturers.  More recent agreements have 
allowed some leeway for newer products in exchange for savings on existing drugs (UK 
Department of Health 1997).  It is notable, too, that the UK pharmaceutical industry has 
become one of the most concentrated in the OECD, as smaller firms have virtually 
disappeared.  
 
Global budgets 
 Faced with both slower growth and rising spending, governments' need to 
preserve short term financial balance became more acute in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Attempts to stabilise or reduce public spending on pharmaceuticals made for unilateral 
price freezes and sometimes price cuts: such measures have affected countries with all 
types of public coverage schemes, in northern, central and southern Europe. 
 Global budgets have been developed by two countries with high levels of 
expenditure, France and Germany, which otherwise had no specific 'managed care' 
features, nor any stringent control of prescription.  France essentially followed Germany's 
example (Schneider 1995): in both countries a national target for drug expenditure was 
set, with financial penalties to be shared by doctors and the pharmaceutical industry if 
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pharmaceutical expenditure should exceed a specified target.  In France, penalties apply 
when total prescribing, whether reimbursed or not, exceeds a certain limit; in Germany, 
to the total payments made by sickness funds for drugs.  These measures seem to have 
led to significantly reduced expenditure in the short term, as doctors in both countries 
have reduced prescribing or (in Germany) substituted cheaper drugs for more expensive 
ones.  Such unilateral measures have generally come at the price of considerable 
disaffection among doctors in both countries, and were suspended in Germany in 2000. 
 
Generic drugs 
 In the majority of OECD countries, there are now explicit policies to promote the 
use of generic drugs.  Generics are sets of drugs with the same chemical compound and 
the same International Common Denomination.  Once products are off-patent, they can 
be sold as generic drugs at a much lower price than branded alternatives.  In recent years, 
with the time limit on patents expiring for an increasing number of products, as well as 
the need to generate savings, the interest in generic drugs has grown. 
 The rising number of patent expirations and the declining number of effective 
years of patent protection first prompted a reaction from national authorities in the United 
States.  Its purpose was to restore appropriate protection for future drugs, allowing for 
high initial returns on innovation in large part by decreasing the return on older existing 
products through the promotion of generics.  In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the Waxman-Hatch Act, repealed existing 
laws that prohibited substitution, and tried at the same time to ensure that savings were 
passed on to consumers (Grabowski and Vernon 1992, Congress Budget Office 1998).  
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Other countries followed suit at the end of the 1980s, mainly those European countries 
with sophisticated regulation systems and high prices such as Germany, Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. 
 Special rapid approval processes make it possible for generic drugs to enter the 
market, although additional legislation, or some deregulation of antisubstitution 
provisions, has been necessary to effectively promote their use.  In the United States, by 
1989, all states had passed drug product substitution laws that allowed pharmacists to 
dispense a generic drug instead of the prescription brand original.  Meanwhile, the 
pressure of buyers (below) has often been the most efficient way to speed up the 
diffusion of generics. 
 Increased use of generic drugs may be encouraged by providing either 
information or economic incentives, or often some combination of the two.  Information 
may take the form of advice to patients or guidelines for physicians (above), as for 
example in Germany, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.  Countries differ, however, 
in the extent to which guidelines are backed by financial incentives.  Simple budget 
constraints serve as one way to increase the prescription of cheaper generics, as has been 
the case for the United Kingdom, as also in France, Germany and the Netherlands.  
Economic incentives may also be directed at the consumer, in the form of reference 
pricing, for example, which can increase the use of generics.  On the whole, generic 
drugs appear to have gained ground only where strong financial incentives have been 
provided, whether to patients, pharmacists or physicians. 
 
Managed care and changed distribution systems 
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 In the United States, managed care organisations have done much to keep 
pharmaceutical costs down.  Instead of specifying a standard copayment for all drugs, for 
example, HMOs differentiate between types of drug (generic or non-generic), and they 
use positive lists and reference pricing for reimbursement purposes.  They have also 
fostered the emergence of more aggressive buyers such as Pharmaceutical Benefit 
Management companies (PBMs), which were a response to the combination of high 
prices and relatively high distribution costs prevalent in pharmaceutical retailing.  They 
began by drafting formularies and negotiating rebates on them from manufacturers, 
which then put them in a position to offer cheaper, integrated delivery service and 
payment systems to major purchasers such as health plans and HMOs.  This changed 
market dynamic has led to a pattern of implicit cross-subsidy among customer categories.  
Private customers in retail pharmacies now pay more in order to compensate producers 
for those sales for which prices have been bargained down. 
 In addition to PBMs, and partly linked to them, new forms of delivery have 
developed through mail-order pharmacies, which cover around 10% of the US market 
and are particularly important for those with chronic illness and older patients (Kane 
1997).  Mail order is also important in Australia and New Zealand, but remains relatively 
uncommon in most European countries.  However, its growth may be stimulated by the 
increasing use of electronic commerce. 
 In some countries, distribution systems remain a full part of the public system, as 
in Sweden, where all pharmacies were nationalised in 1970 to form the Apoteksbolaget, a 
public agency.  In others, meanwhile, chainstores specialised in health related products 
have begun to transform over-the-counter (OTC) drug markets.  They may be seen as a 
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response to restrictive listing on one hand and a rising demand for health care products on 
the other. 
 In all of this, pharmaceutical companies themselves have remained far from 
passive, adopting two key organisational strategies.  Horizontal integration has meant 
merging with or acquiring other companies, partly in order to capture a larger share of the 
market but also to build on a wider portfolio of research and development.  In Europe, for 
example, Novartis is the result of a merger between Swiss companies Sandoz and Ciba-
Geigy; Sweden's AstraZeneca is a merged firm, as is Aventis (between the German firm 
Hoechst and the French Rhone-Poulenc), while GlaxoSmithKline is the result of a merger 
between the already merged firms Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham.  The 
critical synergetic effect of such alliances lies in acquiring compounds for a company's 
own pipeline, or in reducing the time-to-market for new drugs (de Wolf 2000).  Vertical 
integration, meanwhile, has meant buying up or contracting with one or more agents 
operating downstream, in order to obtain better conditions of access to the distribution 
system.  In short, pharmaceutical companies have either acquired rivals or generics 
companies in order to gain new market shares for their products, or specific organisations 
such as PBMs to control their distribution. 
 
Research and development 
 In an important sense, the whole pharmaceutical industry may be viewed as a 
product of the patent system, and in the past, countries without such a patent system have 
been unable to develop a significant innovative pharmaceutical industry.  This is because 
developing new drugs is extraordinarily expensive, and in order to make innovation 
   19
worthwhile, innovators must be allowed not only to recover their costs but also to make 
higher than normal profits, at least in the short term.  The patent system works by 
conferring temporary monopoly power on successful new drugs which pass the 
regulatory tests of safety and efficacy. 
 The use of scientific methods to develop new drugs is fairly recent and has been 
largely influenced by the regulatory process (Scherer 1997).  The drug approval process 
in the United States was initiated with the setting up of the Food and Drug 
Administration in 1938 and strengthened in 1962 by the Kefauver Harris Act, which 
required the FDA to certify that new drugs were not only safe but efficacious.  
Organisations seeking to test a new product now have to obtain an 'Investigation of New 
Drug' authorisation, based on tests of its innocuousness on animals, before human testing 
may begin.  Clinical trials comprise three phases, including blind tests and long-term 
toxicity tests, lasting for a period of 6 years.  In some cases, a fourth phase can be 
required by the FDA (and some countries also require a test of cost-effectiveness). 
 The regulation of pharmaceutical R&D in Europe and Japan has been strongly 
influenced by the American example, especially in the United Kingdom and Germany 
(Thomas 1995).  By setting high standards for market entry for new drugs, these 
countries forced their domestic drug firms to target the development of drugs of superior 
efficacy.  This strong filtering of market entry by regulating product safety and efficacy 
has had an impact not only on costs and prices, but also on quality and the 
competitiveness of the industry as a whole.  In France, by contrast, regulation was for a 
time much less strict, making for shorter admission times.  But by the time formal market 
authorisation was strengthened at the end of the 1970s, the French pharmaceutical 
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industry had lost much of the comparative advantage it had had when very successful in 
the early 1960s (Thomas 1995, Barral 1995). 
 It is important to distinguish 'breakthrough' and 'me too' development in 
pharmaceutical products.  Where research incentives are weak and when market entry is 
relatively easy, the industry may tend to concentrate on what are known as 'me too' 
products, for which innovation at the margin (in packaging, for example) plays a key 
role.  In countries with strictly regulated prices, 'me too' innovation has been used as a 
tool to bypass price controls while contributing only marginally to therapeutic 
improvements (Jacobzone 1998).  In all countries, there is a certain balance to be struck 
between 'breakthrough' and 'me too' innovation.  It is the role of health technology 
assessment and clinical evaluation agencies, such as the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) in the UK, the Institute for Quality and Economy in Healthcare in 
Germany, or the Transparency Committee in France, to quantify the therapeutic value of 
health care products, including pharmaceuticals and to advise governments accordingly. 
 OECD countries differ greatly in their respective interest in pharmaceutical R&D.  
A recent study for the US Congress, for example, argued that price controls in other 
OECD countries slowed the rate of innovation in the US by reducing returns on patented 
drugs (US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration 2004).  While 
some have a large research-based industry, and benefit in part from the higher prices it 
commands, others, without such a research base, are inclined to refuse to pay prices 
which do not promote their own scientific and production systems.  In Australia, 
payments for R&D are allocated to the industry through the factor F scheme, introduced 
in 1988 and now called the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program (PIIP)  
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(Australia Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority 1997).  The scheme grants 
additional support to companies which locate part of their R&D activities in Australia.  
Although trade rules mean that similar policies cannot be developed in the EU, 
government decisions in many European countries have implicitly tried to offer higher 
prices in return for location decisions in favour of their own country.  In Canada, 
improvements in patent protection were made contingent on industry commitments to 
increase R&D spending from 5% to 10% of sales.  In short, OECD governments are often 
ready to allow prices to reflect the high investment costs of R&D if doing so will benefit 
their own economies. 
 
Supranational regulation 
 
 The EU's regulation of pharmaceuticals is derived principally from its concern 
with trade and industry, rather than with health and welfare.  It was the Commission's 
Industry Directorate which, in 1996-1998 convened roundtables with working groups on 
a single market for pharmaceuticals.  Its communication (COM(1998)588) reviewed the 
principal policy options for pharmaceutical markets, discussing price controls, profit 
controls and contractual policies.  It supported the increase in the provision of generic 
drugs, also advocating least-cost purchasing both by providing prescribers with more 
comparative information on drug costs and, where necessary, requiring prescribers to 
share the cost of expensive practice. 
 Because Europe represents such a large share of the world market, what the EU 
does has a significant impact on pharmaceutical activity worldwide.  In 1989, a European 
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Council Directive (89/105/EEC) took up the issue of the transparency of measures 
regulating drug prices and entitlements in national health systems.  Meanwhile, European 
Monetary Union has had some indirect effect on pharmaceutical trading by increasing the 
transparency of price comparisons.  More specifically, provision for a Supplementary 
Protection Certificate (SPC) has extended patent protection at the European level 
(Regulation 1768/92). 
 Drug licensing systems, of course, were first developed independently by 
different European countries (above).  Since then, under EC Regulation 2309/93, a 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) has offered a centralised procedure for 
gaining marketing approval.
vi
  Since January 1998, firms have been able to apply for drug 
licences either country-by-country or on a pan-European basis.  The pan-European 
license saves time and resources in bringing a drug to the market, as well as harmonising 
the conditions for which the drug is licensed.  This legislation also covers product 
classification, advertising, good manufacturing practice and provisions relating to 
labeling and wholesale distribution, though it does not address the provision of drug 
safety information either to health professionals or the public (Mossialos 1998, Earl-
Slater 1997, Kanavos and Mossialos 1999).  Importantly, the EMEA is not subject to 
freedom of information legislation in the way the US FDA is. 
 The organisation and financing of health care, however, remain the responsibility 
of national authorities.  In this way, Europe escapes some of the dilemma (introduction, 
above) which confronts national governments.  Though it has been able to develop 
standard licensing arrangements, its pro-competition industrial policy leaves it no basis 
for action on common pricing (Regulation 2309/93).  Only at national level does 
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monopsony power continue to provide opportunities for price regulation, meaning that 
the enlarged EU still comprises 25 different pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement 
systems.  This makes for a picture of the EC 'coordinating divergence', in which a single 
market in medicines seems unlikely to emerge (Hancher 2004, Permanand and 
Altenstetter 2004). 
 One effect of Europeanisation has been that discussions between national 
authorities and providers in some countries over pricing and reimbursement policies have 
increasingly appealed to European rules (Earl-Slater 1997, Kanavos and Mossialos 1999).  
The European Court of Justice has ruled in favour of parallel imports, for example, and 
has also permitted patients to buy over-the-counter drugs more cheaply other member 
states, provided that they are for personal use and the product is authorised in their home 
country.
vii
 
 Meanwhile, in 1990, on the initiative of the producers' International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Associations, representatives of both industry and 
regulatory agencies began to meet under the auspices of the International Conference in 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use (ICH).  This constitutes a higher level of regulation and coordination again: 
it includes the regulatory agencies of the EU, USA and Japan, and its guidelines are 
invariably endorsed and adopted by them.  The purported logic of harmonization of this 
kind is to bring drugs more quickly and more efficiently to larger markets.  However, 
while both industry and regulators employ a discourse of improved safety and enhanced 
innovation, compromise between different standards in competing jurisdictions is 
invariably made down rather than up.  The relaxation of toxicological standards this 
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entails seems to favour, at least initially, the interests of those developing innovative 
products over those who might use them (Abraham and Reed 2002).
viii
  Meanwhile, in so 
far as ICH seems likely to make it difficult for large generics manufacturers in 
developing countries to enter the market, its effect is to insulate established firms from 
competition (Timmermans 2004). 
 Few accounts of this increasingly sophisticated and extensive regulation of 
pharmaceutical supply suggest any decline in the corporate power of producers (Abraham 
and Lewis 2000, 2002), which seems to beg the key question of what regulation as such 
is for.  It was effectively implemented in Germany and the UK after the sedative 
Thalidomide had been found to cause foetal abnormality in the early 1960s; to the extent 
that Thalidomide damaged public trust in the pharmaceutical industry, the origins of 
regulation lay in the need to restore and protect it (Abraham and Reed 2002).  In most 
countries, medicines regulation is essentially corporatist, reflecting the interdependence 
of government and industry, while the consumer or patient interest is repressed or 
marginalised.  Meanwhile, through the 1980s and 1990s, the neo-liberal position adopted 
by the 'competition state' tends to have made state and industry interests more rather than 
less congruent. 
 This pattern is reinforced in supranational regulation, especially in Europe.  This 
is in part because Europeanisation removes regulation even further from the limited 
opportunities for participation in national policy making.  But it is also due to the way in 
which national regulators compete to carry out assessments on behalf of the EU, which 
they do by speeding up the process, adopting revised criteria which suit producers before 
patients (Lewis and Abraham 2001). 
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Discussion: regulation and learning 
 
 The regulation of pharmaceuticals is a domain in which governments in OECD 
countries – states with Moran's three faces (Moran 1995 and introduction, above) - must 
pursue multiple goals.  Some of these are complementary, some susceptible to reasonable 
trade-offs, others barely compatible.  In choosing and advancing these various goals, 
governments are playing not one multi-level game but several. 
 A key consequence of this is that it is difficult, for its constituent actors as much 
as for the analyst, to make sense of what is going on.  As a recent review of the field put 
it, pharmaceutical regulation seems to offer 'little new, and much that is unconsciously 
replicated, with scant recourse to the evidence base' (Maynard and Bloor 2003, p 39).  
Yet it is precisely here, in a domain which is highly internationalised, which is comprised 
of powerful and autonomous actors such as nation-states, transnational corporations and 
international agencies and in which competitive advantage is at a premium, that we might 
expect to find evidence of learning (even if not from 'evidence'). 
 Some of this learning is familiar from other chapters in this volume.  The 
development of innovative organisational forms like PBMs in the United States has often 
been used as a sort of in vivo social experiment by other countries, to the extent that 
many, if not most of the regulatory instruments in use in the OECD area have been 
influenced by policies originating in the US.  In Europe, the UK represents a lead market, 
which makes UK institutions and initiatives of Europe-wide significance. 
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 That said, simple learning in pharmaceutical regulation is inherently unlikely.  
The dilemmas of government are such that they lend themselves to no single or perfect 
solution.  Though they draw on a common set of instruments, governments select and 
apply them in different ways.  Each seeks to address different combinations of interests 
and institutions, including different ways of thinking about the relationship between 
government, industry and welfare.  And because they are used in bundles with different 
local adaptations, the effect of any single regulatory initiative is specific to circumstance 
and difficult to test comparatively.  Governments simply cannot take up the tools used by 
others, at least not to any equivalent purpose or effect (Mossialos, Walley and Mrazek 
2004, Permanand and Altenstetter 2004, Mossialos and Oliver 2005). 
 At the same time, learning appears to be limited by the particular technical 
complexity of pharmaceuticals, both in themselves and in respect of the policy issues 
(principally licensing and pricing) they raise.
ix
  This certainly mitigates against public 
participation in debate and discussion, and probably also limits government appreciation 
of what it might or should do.  The information and research resources of industry 
outstrip those of government not only in respect of pharmacology but also public policy: 
corporations often understand the respective behaviour of different national and 
international markets better than governments do, and are consistently able to predict and 
manipulate the consequences of different regulatory interventions.  Indeed, it is quite 
literally their business to do so. 
 Government appreciation and action is further constrained by divided (and 
sometimes competing) ministerial competences: between trade and industry on one hand 
and health and social affairs on the other.  This holds at European level, too: EMEA 
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works to the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, not Health and Consumer 
Protection.  Though the UK is generally notable in comparative discussion for its relative 
institutional strength, it is worth specific mention again here.  For it generates the greatest 
volume of what might be described as state-sponsored information about 
pharmaceuticals, including the British National Formulary and the Drug and 
Therapeutics Bulletin as well as PACT data, the National Prescribing Centre's 
Effectiveness Bulletins and other material generated by standards and monitoring 
agencies such as NICE. 
 Beyond that, there is much to suggest that learning is in process within and 
between public and private sectors as much as across countries.  It is driven largely by 
competition, among firms, among governments and then between networks of each.  
Pharmaceutical companies are skilled, resourceful agents which depend on acquiring and 
using cross-national, comparative knowledge about pharmaceutical markets.  As a 
combination of science and commerce, the industry as a whole is perhaps uniquely 
equipped for the diffusion of both hard and soft knowledge about new products, markets 
and ways of relating one to the other.  This generates an isomorphic response on the part 
of governments, which must equip themselves similarly with some multilateral awareness 
of business strategies and ways to respond to and influence them.  What regulatory 
transfer takes place is not the result of a collaborative undertaking among governments to 
face down industry, but of competition between states for economic and industrial 
advantage both at home and abroad.  In terms of price control, for example, governments' 
interest may lie in transferring price-setting instruments.  Yet the point is not to achieve 
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common pricing, but to set prices which trade off the interests of domestic 
pharmaceutical producers and consumers to maximum specific advantage. 
 At bottom, the multilevel and multilateral game played between states and 
pharmaceutical companies is one which reflects their reciprocal interdependence.  
Governments want firms to produce therapeutically effective products, but not at levels 
or prices which put the viability of public health coverage at risk.  Firms want 
governments to provide them with markets and income streams (which is what licensing 
and public coverage do), but not on terms which offer them limited return.  Innovation 
and regulation, in both policies and products, are bound up together. 
 Pharmaceutical regulation is a game both government and industry must play, 
though it would suit neither to win outright.  It is, moreover, a complex game in which 
the rules are constantly changing, including those which govern the authority of the rules.  
The way to stay in the game is to learn, to adapt to new products, policies, firms and 
agencies as they appear.  The situation is very like the one described by Heclo thirty 
years ago: 'What one learns depends on what one does… In both its self-instruction and 
self-delusions, the cobweb of socioeconomic conditions, policy middlemen, and political 
institutions reverberates to the consequences of previous policy in a vast, unpremeditated 
design of social learning' (Heclo 1974, p 316). 
 
 
 
References 
 
   29
Abbott, T A (1995) 'Price regulation in the pharmaceutical industry: prescription or 
placebo?' Journal of Health Economics 14 (5) 551-567 
Abraham, J and Lewis, G (2000) Regulating Medicines in Europe: competition, expertise 
and public health, London: Routledge  
Abraham, J and Lewis, G (2002) 'Citizenship, medical expertise and the capitalist 
regulatory state in Europe', Sociology 36 (1) 67-88 
Abraham, J and Reed, T (2002) 'Progress, innovation and regulatory science in drug 
development: the politics of international standard-setting', Social Studies of Science 
32 (3) 337-369 
Australia Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority (1997) Annual Report 
Balance, R, Pogany, J and Forstner, H (1992) The World's Pharmaceutical Industries: an 
international perspective on innovation, competition and policy, Edward Elgar for 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
Barral, E (1995) 20 ans de résultats de la Recherche Pharmaceutique dans le monde, 
Rhône Poulenc Rorer 
Bloom, N and van Reenen, J (1998) 'Regulating drug prices: where do we go from here?', 
Fiscal Studies 19 (3) 321-342 
Bloor, K and Freemantle, N (1996) 'Lessons from international experience in controlling 
pharmaceutical expenditure II: influencing doctors', British Medical Journal 312 
1525-1527 
Bloor, K, Maynard, A and Freemantle, N (1996) 'Lessons from international experience 
in controlling pharmaceutical expenditure III: regulating industry', British Medical 
Journal 313 33-35 
   30
Congress Budget Office (1998) 'How increased competition from generic drugs has 
affected prices and returns in the pharmaceutical industry', July 
Earl-Slater, A (1997) 'A study of pharmaceutical policies in the EU', Policy Studies 18 
251-267 
Epstein, S (1996) Impure Science; AIDS, activism, and the politics of knowledge, 
University of California Press  
Freemantle, N and Bloor, K (1996) 'Lessons from international experience in controlling 
pharmaceutical expenditure I: influencing patients', British Medical Journal 312 
1469-1471 
Garattini, S and Bertelè, V (2004) 'The role of the EMEA in regulating pharmaceutical 
products', in Mossialos, E, Mrazek, M and Walley, T (eds) Regulating 
Pharmaceuticals in Europe: striving for efficiency, equity and quality, Maidenhead: 
Open UP 
General Accounting Office (1994a) 'Companies typically charge more in the United 
States than in the United Kingdom', GAO/HEHS 94-29   
General Accounting Office (1994b) 'Spending controls in four European Countries', 
GAO/HEHS 94-30  
Grabowski, H G and Vernon, J M (1992) 'Brand loyalty, entry and price competition in 
pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act', Journal of Law and Economics 35 (2) 331-
350 
Hancher, L (2004) 'The European Community dimension: coordinating divergence', in 
Mossialos, E, Mrazek, M and Walley, T (eds) Regulating Pharmaceuticals in 
Europe: striving for efficiency, equity and quality, Maidenhead: Open UP 
   31
Heclo, H (1974) Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: from relief to income 
maintenance, New Haven: Yale UP 
Jacobzone, S (1998) 'Le rôle des prix dans la régulation du secteur pharmaceutique', 
Economie et Statistique 312-313 35-54  
Jacobzone, S (2000) Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social 
and Industrial Goals, Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers no 40, 
Paris: OECD 
Kanavos, P and Costa-Font, J (2005) 'Pharmaceutical parallel trade in Europe: 
stakeholder and competition effects', Economic Policy 20 (44) 751 
Kanavos, P and Mossialos, E (1999) 'Outstanding regulatory aspects in the European 
pharmaceutical market', Pharmacoeconomics 15 (6) 519-533 
Kanavos, P and Reinhardt, U (2003) 'Reference pricing for drugs: is it compatible with 
US health care?', Health Affairs 22 (3) 16-30 
Kanavos, P, Ross-Degnan, D, Fortess, E, Abelson, J and Soumerai, S (2004) 'measuring, 
monitoring and evaluating policy outcomes in the pharmaceutical sector', in 
Mossialos, E, Mrazek, M and Walley, T (eds) Regulating Pharmaceuticals in 
Europe: striving for efficiency, equity and quality, Maidenhead: Open UP 
Kane, N (1997) 'Pharmaceutical cost containment and innovation in the United States', 
Health Policy 41 suppl S71-S89 
Lancry, P J, Paris, V (1995) 'Age, temps et normes: une analyse de la prescription 
pharmaceutique', Economie et Prévision 129-130 173-188 
   32
Lewis, G and Abraham, J (2001) ‘The creation of neo-liberal corporate bias in 
transnational medicines control: the industrial shaping and interest dynamics of the 
European regulatory state’, European Journal of Political Research 39 53-80 
Maynard, A and Bloor, K (2003) 'Dilemmas in regulation of the market for 
pharmaceuticals', Health Affairs 22 (3) 31-41 
Mitchell, A (1996) 'Update and evaluation of Australian guidelines: government 
perspective', Medical Care 34 (1)  DS216-225 
Moran, M (1995), 'Three faces of the health care state', Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law 20 (3) 767-781 
Moran, M (1999) Governing the Health Care State, Manchester: Manchester UP 
Mossialos, E (1998) 'Pharmaceutical pricing, financing and cost containment in the 
European Union member states', in Leidl, R (ed) Health Care and its Financing in the 
Single European Market, Amsterdam: IOS Press  
Mossialos, E and Oliver, A (2005) 'An overview of pharmaceutical policy in four 
countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom', International 
Journal of Health Planning and Management 20 291-306 
Mossialos, E, Walley, T and Mrazek, M (2004) 'Regulating pharmaceuticals in Europe: 
an overview', in Mossialos, E, Mrazek, M and Walley, T (eds) Regulating 
Pharmaceuticals in Europe: striving for efficiency, equity and quality, Maidenhead: 
Open UP 
Mrazek, M and Mossialos, E (2004) 'Regulating pharmaceutical prices in the European 
Union', in Mossialos, E, Mrazek, M and Walley, T (eds) Regulating Pharmaceuticals 
in Europe: striving for efficiency, equity and quality, Maidenhead: Open UP 
   33
Newhouse, J (1993) Free for All? Lessons from the RAND health insurance experiment, 
Harvard University Press 
OECD (2006) OECD Health Data 2006, version 2, October, Paris: OECD 
Permanand, G and Altenstetter, C (2004) 'The politics of pharmaceuticals in the 
European Union', in Mossialos, E, Mrazek, M and Walley, T (eds) Regulating 
Pharmaceuticals in Europe: striving for efficiency, equity and quality, Maidenhead: 
Open UP 
Rochaix, L (1993) 'Le suivi de la prescription pharmaceutique en Grande Bretagne: 
développements récents et perspectives pour la France', Journal d'Economie Médicale 
11 243-250 
Scherer, F M (2000) The Pharmaceutical Industry, in Newhouse, J P and Culyer, A J 
(eds) Handbook of Health Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Schneider, M (1995) 'Evaluation of cost-containment acts in Germany', Health: Quality 
and Choice 63-82 
Schönhöfer, P (1999) [4cc report] 
Seo, T (1994) 'Prescribing and dispensing of pharmaceuticals in Japan', 
PharmacoEconomics 6 (2) 95-102 
Thomas, L G (1995) 'Industrial policy and international competitiveness in the 
pharmaceutical industry', in Helms, R B (ed) Competitive Strategies in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Washington: AEI press 
Timmermans, K (2004) 'Harmonization, regulation, and trade: interactions in the 
pharmaceutical field', International Journal of Health Services 34 (4) 651-661 
   34
UK Department Of Health (1997) Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, second 
report to Parliament, December, London 
US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration (2004) Pharmaceutical 
Price Controls in OECD Countries. Implications for US consumers, pricing, research 
and development, and innovation, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce 
International Trade Administration 
Vandergrift, M and Kanavos, P (1997) 'Health policy versus industrial policy in the 
pharmaceutical sector: the case of Canada', Health Policy 41 241-260 
Weisbrod, B (1991) 'The health care quadrilemma: an essay on technological change, 
insurance, quality of care, and cost containment', Journal of Economic Literature 29 
(2) 523-552 
de Wolf, P (2000) 'Pharmaceuticals as an international industry', in [4cc report] 
 
   35
 
Table 1: total spending on pharmaceuticals, % GDP, selected OECD countries, 
1970-2000 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
     
Canada 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.4 
Germany 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4 
Netherlands  0.6 0.7 0.9 
United Kingdom 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 
United States 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.5 
     
OECD 17 mean 0.81 0.84 0.95 1.25 
OECD 30 mean    1.34 
source: OECD (2006) 
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Table 2: public spending on pharmaceuticals, % public spending on health, selected 
OECD countries, 1970-2000 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
     
Canada 0.3 2.8 5.1 8 
Germany 14.1 12.5 13.7 12.3 
Netherlands 10.2 7.7 9.5 10.8 
United Kingdom 10 9.7 10.8 12.6 
United States 1.9 1.9 2.9 5.1 
     
OECD 17 mean 13.1 9.9 10.9 12.4 
OECD 30 mean    13.8 
source: OECD (2006) 
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i
 This chapter is based on Jacobzone, S (2000) Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling 
Social and Industrial Goals, Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers no 40, Paris: OECD; 
<http://www.olis.oecd.org/OLIS/2000DOC.NSF/LINKTO/DEELSA-ELSA-WD(2000)1>.  I am grateful to 
Peter Schönhöfer for comments on an earlier draft, and to Achim Schmid for supplying the data used in 
tables 1 and 2.  Mistakes and misconceptions which remain are my own. 
ii
 The expenditure patterns described and analysed here do not include pharmaceuticals in hospitals.  Drugs 
in hospitals are estimated to represent roughly 10 to 15 % of the total pharmaceutical market, and in most 
budgets are included under inpatient care.  While innovative patented drugs play a more important role in 
inpatient settings, trends for hospital drugs are similar to those observed for drugs used in ambulatory care. 
iii
 In both tables 1 and 2 here, Netherlands 1970 figures are in fact taken from 1972, and UK 2000 figures 
from 1997.  OECD 17 countries are Australia (1970=1971), Belgium (2000=1997), Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands (1970=1972), New Zealand 
(1970=1971), Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom (2000=1997) and the United States. 
iv
 For a recent review of price regulation in the EU, see Mrazek and Mossialos (2004). 
v
 For a discussion of the possible application of reference pricing in the US, see Kanavos and Reinhardt 
(2003). 
vi
 For description and discussion of the workings of the EMEA, see Garattini and Bertelè (2004). 
vii
 In Europe, the effect of parallel imports on prices seems minimal, since such drugs tend to be priced just 
below those from original sources.  Generics are much more important in price competition (Kanavos and 
Costa-Font 2005). 
viii
 That said, patient interests are perhaps less than obvious.  The key achievement of 'treatment activists' in 
respect of AIDS, especially in the US, has been to speed up the release of experimental drugs, overcoming 
established requirements for medical trials (Epstein 1996). 
ix
 For discussion of the fundamental methodological challenges of price measurement, see Jacobzone 
(2000, pp46-48); on measuring policy outcomes, Kanavos et al (2004). 
